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THE E N E M Y WITHIN I S L A M
LAINA FARHAT-HOLZMAN,
INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR, APTOS, CALIFORNIA

Abstract
The recent spread of political, radical Islam around the world has
captured the attention of the secular world. This movement has
launched a spate of violence and unrest, culminating in the al-Qaeda
attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Public interest in
Islam has not been so keen since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in
1979—another event that took the world by surprise.
Political observers have pinpointed the Saudis as the source of the
problem. Not only were the majority of the terrorist bombers Saudi, but
also they were thoroughly indoctrinated into the severe Muslim
Wahhabi sect that is unique to Arabia. Or rather, it used to be unique.
Today, thanks to massive infusions of money and willing missionaries,
this sect has spawned thousands of religious schools throughout the
non-Arabic-speaking Muslim world, from Afghanistan and Pakistan
through Central Asia, Malaysia, and Indonesia and the Philippines.
These schools are producing willing sacrificial foot soldiers of the new
global Jihad, [see V. S. Naipaul, Beyond Belief, and Jeffrey Goldberg;
Robert D. Kaplan]
Some political observers have noted that this rise of radical Islam
was spurred by the successful Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.
[Farhat-Holzman, ["Janus Revisited"] Iranians, who adhere to the
minority Shiite sect of Islam, are not much loved by the majority Sunni
Muslims, and in particular, by Arabs. However, ideas are contagious.
Political Islam, once specifically Iranian Shiite, has become the
inspiration for the radicalization of Islam worldwide. What may not be
as obvious to observers is that Shiite values themselves have transformed the practices of Islam in regions that consider themselves Sunni.
The religion is changing daily, and its consequences are being felt
everywhere.
Introduction
Many political observers have claimed that the current crisis of
Radical Islam can be laid on the doorstep of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi
sect that dominates Islam in Arabia has embarked in global missionary
work during the past twenty years of Saudi oil wealth. Across Central
Asia, Indonesia, Africa, and into Europe and the United States, mosque
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building and intensive recruitment of converts has gone on unhindered
by the host countries who did not know until recently that this gift was
accompanied by brainwashing and terrorism training. [Emerson:
American Jihad.]
What is less obvious about this campaign is that the stern face of
Wahhabism is a mirror image of Islam's minority sect, Shia Islam. What
seems to have launched the Saudi Wahhabis on their campaign to
seduce minds and hearts and topple governments was the success of
Shiite Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. This aged cleric toppled the modernizing monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and then hijacked the
revolution from the young secular socialists who innocently thought
they would rule.
On the surface of things, the conflicts between the Sunni and
Shiites remind us of the long and bloody struggle between the Catholics
and the Protestants in the 16th and 17lh centuries. However, the Christian
struggle was largely doctrinal—there were real issues between
Catholics and Protestants on how to interpret the Bible—and to a
degree, the issue of authority: the Pope and hierarchy in Rome or each
person's conscience and freedom to interpret independently. With the
Shia-Sunni struggle, however, the issue is not doctrinal at all; rather, it
has ethnic roots and can be traced to Iranian-Arab antipathy. It also has
political roots—the difference between a people with an imperial history and those with a Bedouin-merchant history. [See Raphael Patai for
further discussion.]
Despite this long history of bad blood between Shiite and Sunni
Islam, we are seeing a new twist today. The values and techniques of
Shia are being adopted by Sunni Muslims in areas that were once moderate and rather relaxed about religion. Although the Saudi Wahhabis
carried the water, Shia Islam seems to have carried the underlying religious-political philosophy. It will be apparent after surveying the roots
of Shia and its characteristics that this once minority sect has set the
modern Muslim agenda. What Shia offers is a "culture of resentment,"
which appeals to the emotions of millions of Muslims around the world.
In this paper, I will trace the Shia "dissident" sect from its beginnings in the birth of Islam, explore its two most famous practitioners
(the first in the 11th century and the second in the 20th), and then examine today's radical Islam as it is being practiced around the world today.
The resemblance between the practices of current radicals and Shiite
practitioners does not seem coincidental.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol48/iss48/6

2

Farhat-Holzman: The Enemy Within Islam

50

Comparative Civilizations Review

Most of us never heard of Shiites until the Iranian Revolution in
1978-9. We learned then that only 10 percent of Muslims around the
world adhere to this dissident sect, while the remaining Muslims are
Sunni, or traditional Muslims. Most Shiites live in Iran, where they represent 90% of the population. In addition, perhaps 60% the population
of Iraq is Shiite, but there are also pockets, remnants of Shiite merchants, in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria,
Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, where they are
watched with suspicion by the host governments. Governments fear this
sect because of its turbulent past and equally turbulent present. Shiites
are hostile to all governments, which they consider illegitimate, until a
descendant of the Prophet Mohammad returns to rule the world.
Origin of the Sect. The split in Islam can be traced back to its very
beginnings in the 7th century CE. When the Prophet Mohammad died,
he left no will in which he might have appointed a successor to himself
as Commander of the Faithful. His followers met in traditional Bedouin
style and selected the Caliph (or religious-political successor) by consensus from among their number. Their criteria were ostensibly competence and piety, but in truth, as with every organization, political considerations played a large role.
Although one of the candidates for Caliph was Ali, the cousin and
son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad, he was passed over three times
and only became the fourth caliph after a turbulent campaign by his followers, the Party of Ali (Shiites). [Armstrong: Muhammad; Lewis: The
Arabs in History, Kiernan: The Arabs, and Hourani: A History of the
Arab Peoples.
The conflicting views of the early Muslims had to do with succession. Some insisted that the Prophet's family should be accorded political power, but others supported the rough democracy of Bedouin tradition. The backers of Ali did not fare well. Ali was assassinated shortly
after assuming power, and his two sons, one of whom challenged the
next appointed Caliph, were slaughtered, along with most of their families, in a pitched battle in the Mesopotamian desert. Their surviving
supporters went underground and seethed for centuries with bitterness
and a sense of injustice. The central holiday of Shiites to this day is the
emotional mourning for the young martyrs who died on the
Mesopotamian plains so long ago.
To see how these feelings of injustice have survived to today, one
need only witness the processions of the Shiite pious in Iran who relive
the millennium-old slaughter in the desert by beating themselves with
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chains and knives, chanting and drawing blood. The enemy is clearly
the Sunni establishment. Old-fashioned Iranian ice cream parlors in
Tehran have wall murals depicting the battle and slaughter of the "innocents." The source of resentment has been stirred up in Iran for the past
four centuries, through fiery sermons, processions, and even a religious
passion play (the Taziye), and was only beginning to disappear under
the secular-minded Pahlavi dynasty. The Islamic Revolution revived it.
What was at stake here was that oldest of political arguments: is
bloodline (as in monarchy) or election by a council of elders the best
way to guarantee good rule? Until the past few centuries (except for
ancient Athens and Republican Rome), blood was considered the most
important issue in the legitimacy of a ruler. Those who hold to such a
view have not been vindicated by history. Royal descent, certainly as
successive generations of kings follow a great first king, generally illustrates increasing decadence, weakness, and incompetence.
But how do Muslims think the Prophet Mohammad felt about this
issue? The Sunnis note that Mohammad did not leave a will; he only
ordered that his body be buried simply so that there would be no cult of
worship that would follow his death. He wanted to make it clear that he
was only a prophet, and not a divine figure. A verse in the Koran
expresses Mohammad's admonition about avoiding the cult of personality:
Muhammad is naught but a Messenger; Messengers have passed
away before him. Why, if he should die or is slain, will you turn upon
your heels? If any man should turn about on his heels, he will not
harm God in any way; and God will recompense the thankful. Sura

3.138.
For many centuries, orthodox Islam accepted this principle. But as
the Muslim hordes swept through non-Arab realms in their thrust for
empire, the conquered peoples did not speak Arabic, were not part of
Bedouin tradition, and furthermore, their experience was with the
bloodline tradition of hereditary rule.
The fall of the Persian Empire to the Arab invaders was a shock to
the Iranians, from which they have never quite recovered. Iranians have
always been ambivalent about Islam, to the point of having their own
aristocratic version of the religion or a flood of irreverent humor
(underground) that has circulated for centuries.
The Shiite faction in support of Mohammad's daughter's children
may have died on the plains of Iraq, but this loss became an under-
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ground movement taken up by the Iranians. Many Iranian aristocrats
claim the Prophet's blood in their ancestry (as do the Kings of Jordan
and Morocco), which gives them some cachet among the religious
lower classes. Of course, such bloodline claims are as unprovable as the
thousands of "pieces of the true cross" that were hawked during the
Middle Ages to the gullible pious in Europe. There are altogether too
many "black turbans" around for credibility. (The Black Turban is the
badge of those claiming descent from the Prophet.)
The sect flourished in Persian soil and when the last Caliph with
any credible descent from the Prophet's family died, his death was
mythoiogically transformed into a disappearance. He was not really
dead, they said, but hidden somewhere and he would return at the right
time to preside over a Muslim world. Until then, no leadership could be
considered legitimate, and was only to be tolerated while satisfactory
and brought down by force when objectionable to the Shiites. The
Shiites appointed themselves the arbiters of good and bad rule. [Lewis:
The Assassins.]
For centuries, the devotion to saints and shrines flourished in Iran,
from southwest to northeast (today's Afghanistan). In Qom, a town
south of today's Tehran, there is a shrine to Fatima, the sister of the
eighth "Imam," a woman with the same name as the Prophet
Mohammad's daughter (which may cause some confusion among illiterate women praying for fertility).
Qom was originally a military barracks for the invading Arabs, and
only later a Shiite pilgrimage site. It has since been made famous as a
center of Shiite learning that gave rise to the Ayatollah Khomeini.
Fatima's brother, Imam Reza, a man who claimed descent from the
Prophet and who was the bosom buddy of a Caliph in Baghdad, died in
Mashhad, a town on the eastern border of Iran, at the gateway to Central
Asia. A practice of worship has grown up around this man, and more
Iranian pilgrims visit this shrine than any other, aside from Kerbala in
Iraq, the burial place of the Prophet's martyred grandsons. The gossip
about Imam Reza's relationship with the Caliph died out well before the
mythology about Reza's sainthood, which is a key pillar of Shiite faith
in Iran.
The Assassin King, Hasan-i Sabbah. Bernard Lewis, the dean of
Islamic studies, is the source to consult for insight into the infamous
"Old Man of the Mountain," the world's first international terrorist
leader. Lewis charts the rise of this terrorist cult (I use "cult" here
because it had no theological base, but relied on total obedience to a
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leader.) He traces it from the succession crisis after Mohammad's death
in 632 AD, through the chaotic 8th century when extremist Shiite sects
and sub-sects tried, through assassination and unrest, to unseat the
Baghdad Caliphate. The terrorism failed, and the Shiites split into two
groups: the Ismaili's who followed the disinherited elder son of the 6th
Imam (line of the Prophet), who died in 765 AD. The other Shiites shifted their allegiance to Ismail's younger brother, whose followers continued until the 12th Imam, who "disappeared" in 873 and is still awaited
by Shiites today. The Ayatollah Khomeini stems from this tradition, as
do most Iranian Muslims.
According to Lewis, what characterizes most Shiite organized
groups is that their semi-holy leader runs all three branches of government: bureaucracy, religious hierarchy, and armed forces.
The first example of a Shiite state occurred from 909 to 1171 in
Egypt. Named the "Fatimid Caliphate" to honor the Prophet's daughter
Fatima, this government did not win the hearts and minds of Egyptians,
especially when one of their Caliphs, al-Hakim, claimed to be God. The
Egyptians turned them out. But during this administration's tenure, its
leading institution, al-Azhar University, attracted Iranian students. The
idea of transferring allegiance to a "hidden Imam" was appealing; this
idea was transplanted abroad. It was taken up by an Iranian Shiite, who
had been trained in the Egyptian Shiite schools and who took the ideas
home with him.
The man was Hasan-i Sabbah, born in the 11th century in Qom, a
town already beginning to nurture Shiite sympathies. Hasan received a
religious education both in Qom and Egypt, and when Egypt cast out
the Shiites, he founded his own sect and took it back to Iran. His followers were passionate fanatics who were sworn enemies of the newest
Muslims in the region, the conquering Sunni Seljuq Turks.
Sabbah found an impregnable castle named Alamut in the Elborz
Mountains of Western Iran, and he bought the owner out and established
his community of assassins there. He ruled Alamut for the next 35
years.from where he directed attacks on the most powerful and famous
men in Islam and sowed fear internationally. His mission was to win
converts and secure more castles, and to this end, he sent out agents to
carry out assassinations far and wide. He actually boasted that he would
unseat the Sunni Caliphate in Baghdad and replace it with the perfect
Muslim empire—under himself, of course.
There is a curiously modern note that assassination and drugs were
intertwined. He used hashish to addict young assassins, who were then
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willing to go forth and find and murder anyone fingered by their master. These young men were also willing to die in their mission, if so
required. One judge in Isfahan wore armor, had a bodyguard, and took
precautions—but was murdered at Friday prayers in a mosque. That
same year (1108-9), Grand Vazir Nizam al-Mulk, the most powerful
man of his time, was wounded by an assassin in Baghdad, but survived.
Bernard Lewis tells us that Hasan-i Sabbah knew that his preaching could not prevail against the entrenched orthodoxy of Sunni
Islam—that his followers could not meet and defeat the armed might of
the Seljuq state. Others before him had vented their frustration in disorganized violence, in hopeless insurrection, or in sullen passivity.
Hasan found a new way, by which a small force, disciplined and devoted, could strike effectively against an overwhelmingly superior enemy.
Terrorism can be defined as actions carried on by a narrowly limited
organization and inspired by a sustained program of large-scale objectives in the name of which terror is practiced. This was the method that
Hasan chose—the method that he may well have invented.
What was characteristic of Ismaili Shiite doctrine is characteristic
of modern state Shia in Iran today. The doctrine is authoritarian, with
the believer having no right of choice. He was compelled to follow the
authorized teaching of an Imam or his accredited representative.
Furthermore, the Imam could not be elected, as was common in Sunni
Islam. Shiites were told that God appointed the Imam and the Imam was
the sole repository of truth. "Only the Imam could validate both revelation and reason; only the Ismaili Imam, by the nature of his office and
teaching, could in fact do this, and he alone therefore was the true
Imam. His rivals were usurpers, their followers sinners, their teachings
falsehood," according to Bernard Lewis.
Sabbah's strange monastic order came to an end, along with the
Caliphate in Baghdad, when the Mongol hordes came through and
destroyed them both in 1258. However, the resentful, bitter, and dictatorial qualities of Shiite Islam remained entrenched in this "Party of
Ali" among their many survivors, in pockets across North Africa and in
to Central Asia. In Iran a fanatical Turkic tribe in the 16th century, the
Safavids, seized power and mandated Shia as the state religion.
Arabs and The Other Converts. The Arabs, who were the first
bearers of the faith of Mohammad, poured out across a non-Arab world.
Their first major conquest was the Persian Empire, and from there they
swept through Central Asia, northern India, and eventually as far afield
as Malaysia and Indonesia (then Malaya and the Spice Islands). Unlike
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most of the people they conquered and converted, the Arabs were initially relatively egalitarian. All Muslims, convert or native-born, were
supposed to be treated equally under the law.
However, people being what they are, the Arabs wanted to be the
first among equals, and later, the superior among inferiors. In Persia,
peasants converted in considerable numbers because for the first time,
they were treated with dignity (and were spared from paying the head
tax). Many aristocrats converted too (with mental reservations) because
that was the way to survive and get ahead. The aristocrats learned
Arabic, but maintained their Persian language, which was revived at the
first possible time that the Arab grip had loosened, two centuries after
conquest.
The only conquered people who maintained knowledge of their
pre-Islamic history were the Iranians. Everywhere else that Arabs prevailed, there was a concerted campaign to stamp out any cultural memory prior to conversion. V.S. Naipaul in his book Beyond Belief, calls
this "Arab cultural imperialism." He attributes the unrest and general
unhappiness of Asian Muslims to this hole in their history. We see evidence of this today in Afghanistan (with the destruction of the great
Buddhist sculptures), Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Because of the way Islam was transmitted, those who were nonArabs were at a disadvantage because they could not read the holy texts
for themselves. They were compelled to rely on authorities (hence the
mullahs and imams) for interpretation of the faith. This suited the dictatorial nature of Shia Islam and it suited the experience of people
accustomed to obeying an absolute monarch and his authorized agents.
Furthermore, because the sect was so passionate, angry, and full of
drama, it served as a safety valve for unhappy subjects. People's anger
could be directed at an injury centuries old rather than at their current
leaders.
The Ayatollah Khomeini: Shia Resurgent. The tacit relationship
between Iran's monarchs and the Shiite hierarchy kept Iran backward
and turbulent for the past four centuries. The monarchy did not dare
innovate or institute change, and the clergy kept the rage of an unhappy
population channeled into religious processions and dramas. Predatory
tribes made the roads dangerous, protection money had to be paid to
move goods, and the central government had to rely on the feudal lords
and feudal clergy to provide armed men when needed. Of course such
soldiers were loyal to their masters, not to the state. (This, of course,
sounds like Afghanistan under the Taliban.)
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In the turbulent 19th century, there were numerous Shiite and
Shiite-like pockets of rebellion both in Iran and in other Middle Eastern
Muslim states. Shia became identified with anti-government hostility
and even, for a brief time, constitutional reform in Iran (1905-6). This
movement was reversed by the feudal establishment, with the help of
the Tsarist Russians. Then the Pahlavi Dynasty assumed power (1926)
and began the modernization and secularization process.
Despite a great leap forward for backward Iran, a revolution
unseated the modernizers and a reactionary Shiite revolution won the
day. The charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini triumphed in 1979, after years
of suppression and resentment. He undid what he could of modern institutions and hijacked what many young people thought would be the triumph of socialist democracy. Furthermore, he appeared to triumph over
the superpower United States, which did not go unnoticed by Sunni
Muslims. [See Farhat-Holzman.]
Shiite-Like Radical Islamic Movements. Sunni Muslims who
were looking for a way to expand Muslim (and their own) power found
the techniques and emotions of Shia useful. They could be incorporated to harness the directionless unhappiness of once moderate Muslims
who felt powerless. They felt powerless against their incompetent and
authoritarian governments, powerless against Western culture which
was overwhelming their young, and powerless against the enormous
and restless population explosion of youth.
Movements such as the al-Qaeda terrorists made use of elements
they observed in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Osama bin Laden, a
member of a billionaire Saudi family, created an outlaw organization
dedicated to bringing the Muslim world back to strict, literal adherence
to his (and Wahhabi) perception of early Islam. They preached messianic sermons about the wonderful future when Islam would once more
dominate the world. They revived a rather skewed history about how
wonderful the early world of Islam was, but were very careful not to
encourage exploration of pre-Islamic history. (The Ayatollah Khomeini
tried, but failed to suppress the knowledge of pre-Islamic history and
such holidays as the ancient Zoroastrian New Year by Iranians). And
like Osama's predecessor, Hasan-i Sabbah, Osama set up cells around
the world of dedicated assassin/suicide-murderers.
The Taliban Experiment in Afghanistan. Until a few years ago,
the only place that the Saudi's Wahhabi sect could be seen in action was
Saudi Arabia. Religious police enforce their notion of Islam with whips,
lashings, amputations, and beheadings. It is a closed country where vis-
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itors cannot come without a sponsor and prior approval, where women
are totally segregated and totally invisible under black shrouds, and
where there is no such thing as participatory government or free press.
It is a religious police state, and if it were not for the geological good
fortune of sitting on a giant pool of oil, nobody would care what it does.
However, that pool of oil has been funding turbulent factions
throughout the world. It has financed the likes of Osama bin Laden and
his terrorist network, as well as thousands of Muslim "schools"
throughout both the Arab Muslim world and the non-Arab Muslim east.
Youngsters who "graduate" from these brainwashing academies can
only memorize the Koran and receive training to become holy war martyrs.
When the Saudis helped finance the Afghan war against the Soviet
invasion (with American help), a number of Muslim fanatics received
guerrilla military training. These "veterans" have fanned out across the
world to form cells of Osama bin Laden's holy war to be directed
against Jews, Zionists, and Americans—all enemies of Allah, said bin
Laden.
Afghanistan drove out the Russians, but then failed to create a credible central government, so in time-honored fashion, the warlords went
after each other and trashed the country altogether. Osama found
Afghanistan a perfect place to set up his corporation (Terror, Inc.) and
he helped establish a puppet government, the Taliban, graduates of the
Saudi religious academies in Pakistan, under the leadership of a oneeyed veteran, Mullah Omar. That the Mullah never even graduated from
the religious academy did not matter to his followers. He was a perfect,
utterly ignorant, charismatic figure. Osama's organization flattered
Omar and he took on delusions of grandeur, without realizing that the
tail was wagging the dog. [Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.]
The Taliban set up a religious state that resembled Saudi Arabia but
was even more backward and unlike oil-rich Arabia, desperately poor.
Every day new edicts came out from on high that were enforced by religious police who were fully empowered to punish. Women, who had
comprised the majority of government workers and teachers at all levels, were sacked and were confined to house arrest. An all-concealing
shroud was mandatory—and it went one better than the Saudis—this
garment did not even permit the eyes to be seen—or to scarcely see—
through an embroidered mesh.
There were to be no kite flying, no keeping of song birds, no chess,
no backgammon, nor anything else that looked like it might be fun.
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Women were not to be heard ever (rubber-soled shoes) and no talking
or singing that could be heard by men. Lower story windows were to
be painted over so that women could not be seen (nor see out) from their
homes.
All schooling for girls was forbidden. Most of what had become
very meager medical care was barred to women as well. Television was
banned, as were cinema and anything other than local radio.
Afghanistan had become a giant jail.
Shiite Elements?
Although the Taliban and Osama's peculiar
sect, the al-Qaeda, claimed Sunni adherence, there were several practices that look suspiciously Shiite. One institution was the "temporary
wife" system, in which a traveling Muslim could engage in contractual
sex for one hour to 99 years. This is not a Sunni custom (and is not
domestic concubinage), but the al-Qaeda and Taliban engaged in this
free pass at will. Since their loss of Afghanistan, there are countless
women forced into such "marriages," women who have been abandoned by their fleeing masters and are without legal Islamic status.
Another Shiite element is the reverence for the Prophet's descendants and passion for religious relics. Shiites, unlike Sunnis, maintain
holy shrines throughout their territories that supposedly house the bodies, bones, or (in Kandahar, Afghanistan) the supposed cloak of
Muhammad himself. One mosque in Northern India houses a hair from
the beard of the Prophet Mohammad, and blood has been shed over this
pilgrimage site.
While journalist Robert Kaplan was trekking through Pakistan and
Afghanistan in the late 1990s, he was present when the now notorious
Mullah Omar, the holy leader of the Taliban, stood before a mob and
donned the holy relic, a brown cloak, supposedly belonging to the
Prophet Mohammad himself. Some observers were shocked by his
boldness.
The cloak had originally been housed in Samarkand, the city of
Tamerlane in Uzbekstan. Several centuries ago, an Afghan king briefly
took Samarkand and then asked to look at the holy relic. He promised
he would move it no farther than a rock at his feet. The robe was
brought out and he then ordered his men to pick up the rock too, and
moved both of them back to Kandahar. [Kaplan] So much for honor.
But even more important, how could they think a robe worn by the
Prophet could have survived from the 7th century? And even if it had,
why would this be significant?
Shiites base their sect on resentment of secular rulers. In their eyes,
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only a descendant of the family of Ali would have legitimacy. As a
result, this community is easy to arouse, and can easily assume the mantle of martyrdom. A new "cult of martyrdom" has now taken root among
Sunni Muslims—given new and grotesque life among the Palestinians,
as well as among all Muslims who are rallied to fight to the death the
"Crusaders and Jews."
Consequences
There is little doubt that our era has begun an engagement that
Samuel P. Huntington called "The Clash of Civilizations." When
Huntington's book first came out, I thought he had gone too far in lumping all Islam under a consistent "civilization." It seemed to me that the
Muslim world was itself divided into very different cultures: a modern
or modernizing elite, whose children went to school in Europe and the
United States; a burgeoning middle class that was somewhat educated
in mostly secular schools; an illiterate peasantry and working class that
was religious; and a handful of dissident groups that were seeking solutions to their badly functioning authoritarian states in either
Communism or renewed religious fanaticism. In a clash, surely the elite
and most of the middle class would not be hostile to modernization and
would not be fanatics, would they?
Since Huntington wrote his book, the scene has changed. The
Islamists—who have much that looks like Shiite values to me—have
nearly silenced any opposition in their countries. Even the gradually
secularizing Egypt has pulled back and fundamentalism is increasingly
applying pressure in the daily lives of Egyptians.
Indonesia, which was rather moderately Muslim and had a secular
authoritarian government, is now attempting democracy. The government is so afraid of the street power of Islamists that they dare not arrest
even international criminals, such as influential mullah who runs a
Wahhabi-type religious school and urges attacks on the west, on
Indonesian Christians, and backsliding Muslims.
Despite protestations from our own national leadership that we are
not at war with Islam but only with fanatical terrorist cults, it looks to
me (and increasingly to other scholars) that war is already exploding
between the modern developed world and the world of Islam. Those
Muslims who would like a modern life with separation of governance
from their faith will increasingly flee to our side, leaving the poor, the
unhappy, and the violence into which Islam has sunk, to fight a losing
war with the West.
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Perhaps it requires a crisis such as the one that Islam faces today
for Islam to experience the same sort of reformation that Christianity
and Judaism had in the 17th and 18th centuries. A handful of educated
scholars in the Muslim world are contemplating the unthinkable: that
for Islam to survive as a profound and spiritual religion, it must be
unchained from government and compulsion. This movement is small,
but offers the one hope for the future of Islam to survive its current disastrous trajectory.
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